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COLORADO AND MINIMUM JUDICIAL
STANDARDS
PETER H. HOLME, JR.
Chairmanof the Judiciary Committee of the Colorado Bar Association

This article was originally planned as a book review of the
massive survey of standards of judicial administration in the
United States entitled, "Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration," written by Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of New Jersey.1 However, because of the legislative program of the Colorado Bar Association, the preparation
of which is now almost completed, and because that program bears
directly upon many of the matters discussed in Judge Vanderbilt's
book, this article has expanded into a discussion of the Colorado
program and its relationship to many of the minimum standards
analyzed in Vanderbilt's work. The comparison of Colorado's
present system with the proposed one should demonstrate the purpose of the program to bring Colorado more closely into line with
those states having modern, efficient and economical judicial administration.
Judge Vanderbilt's book is a compendium of facts with respect to the various methods of administering justice in the fortyeight states and the District of Columbia. The "minimum standards" referred to in the title are those standards adopted by the
American Bar Association over a period of years, setting forth
its view as to the minimum essential requirements for the efficient
and effective administration of a court system operating in modern times. Judge Vanderbilt takes each of these standards separately and analyzes the pertinent laws and methods used by each
of the states, in order to determine whether such states approach
the minimum standards. The guideposts adopted by the ABA
cover a wide field. They range from recommendations for methods of judicial selection to trial practice, from selection of juries
to codes of evidence. This article will not attempt to cover this
wide field insofar as Colorado is concerned. Rather, it will be
limited primarily to a discussion of Colorado's standing in regard
to the minimum standards for handling the business of the courts
and Colorado's treatment of its judges. It will then discuss ways
in which Colorado's standing may be improved, suggesting as one
possibility the legislative program of the Colorado Bar Association to be proposed for adoption by the 1951 General Assembly.
First, perhaps, we should review the broader reasons for the
improvement of our present system. As the Denver Post said,
in substance, in a recent editorial: "In the last analysis, no govI Published by the National Conference of Judicial Councils, 1949.
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ernment can be better than its courts." This statement is one of
those truisms obvious enough to be frequently forgotten. Equally
obvious is the corollary that the bench must be staffed by the men
in the state most qualified by training, ability and character to
discharge their vital duties. To obtain such men, we must continuously and unrelentingly study and review the provisions made
by our laws for the treatment of judges.
Secondly, the organization of the courts and the procedures
used for the handling of their business must be constantly studied
and improved so that they may keep pace with the changing needs
of the community. Many writers have pointed out that our courts
must be maintained on a modern level or they will be lost.
Our situation in Colorado is certainly not one to justify complacency. The Colorado Bar Association, recognizing this, has,
through its Judiciary Committee, been working for five years to
suggest remedies for some of the more serious defects in our
present system. The program outlined below does not purport to
be a complete panacea for all the ailments that can befall a judicial system. It simply represents a few progressive steps toward
the greater improvement that is needed to restore Colorado to
its appropriate place in the administration of justice. We must
recognize that it is part of the professional obligation of lawyers
to take the lead in reforms of this sort, rather than to wait, as
has been done in some other states, for a scandalous situation to
develop which would raise a public clamor for reform.
IMPROVEMENT OF JUDICIAL PERSONNEL

Of first importance in any court system is the caliber of the
men who hold judicial office. A career on the bench has always
been intrinsically attractive to attorneys of scholarly leanings and
high purpose. In its proper setting, the post of judge is one of
dignity and honor, as well as of great responsibility. The problem,
therefore, of inducing properly qualified attorneys to undertake
such a career should be relatively easy to solve. Historically, it
has been easy to solve. However, in recent years obstacles have
arisen which must be removed. The first of these obstacles is
financial. As Judge Vanderbilt says:
The problem of financial security is of importance in obtaining
fit persons for judicial office, and an attempt is being made to provide
salaries commensurate with the importance of the office.

There is no need to repeat here the obvious and unanswerable
arguments which have been made in support of this proposition.
The following will simply point out the steps proposed by the
Colorado Bar Association to overcome the obstacle of inadequate
compensation and financial insecurity presently existing.
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Proposed ConstitutionalAmendment

The first proposal of the Colorado Bar Association is that
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution be amended so as to
provide for judges what, in effect, may be called a "rubber dollar."
At the time Section 18 was originally written, it did not take into
account inflation of the sort that our economy has experienced
since. If the dollar were stable, there would be much to be said
in favor of retaining the present constitutional prohibition against
increasing or decreasing the salary of a judge during his term
of office. A realistic appraisal of the situation, however, demonstrates that this prohibition is obsolete in the present day. As
now written, this Section 18 of the Constitution works a particular hardship on those officeholders who must serve a relatively
long term of office. Foremost among these are judges of our
Supreme Court, whose term is ten years. The bar association, to
meet this problem, therefore, proposes an amendment which provides in part:
Judges of courts of record shall receive such compensation as may
be provided by law which may be increased or decreased during their
terms.

The inclusion of the provision for decrease demonstrates that the
intention is not to place judges in an unassailable preferred position, but simply to enable the legislature to maintain them in an
appropriate relative position in the economy. This provision will
also prevent in the future the presently existing flagrant inequity
attributable to the existing constitutional provision, i.e., the fact
that the junior judges on the Supreme Court are receiving more
salary than their senior colleagues. Specific salary relief proposed by the bar association for all Colorado judges will be discussed below in the appropriate places.
The second provision of importance bearing upon the requirement of maintaining only qualified personnel on the bench is that
creating a procedure for the removal of disabled judges from
office. It is startling to note, as pointed out in Judge Vanderbilt's
book, that "In only one state, Colorado, is no provision made for
the removal of judges from office." 2 It is thus possible in Colorado for attorneys and litigants to be faced with what may amount
to complete denial of an effective forum. Suppose, for example,
that a district judge perfectly qualified when he assumes office,
shortly thereafter becomes totally disabled, either physically or
mentally. In Colorado there is now no way to remove such a
judge from office or to create a vacancy which may be filled by a
qualified and active judge. Thus, if this should occur in a dis2 Of course this statement does not refer to the remedy of impeachment, which is
applicable only in cases of "high crimes or misdemeanors or malfeasance in office
* * *" Colorado Constitution, Article XIII, Section 2.

4
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trict where there is only one district judge, litigants are faced
with the lack of a functioning court to which they may go. If
any assistance is rendered, it must come on a voluntary basis from
some judge of another district who under our present laws may
incur a serious personal sacrifice and financial hardship if he
renders such assistance.
To meet this situation, the Colorado Bar Association proposes
the further amendment of Article VI of the Constitution by the
addition of a new section, Section 31, which reads as follows:
Section 31. Retirement.-Any judge of any court now existing in
the State of Colorado, or hei-eafter created, shall be retired from
office if found permanently disabled, by reason of mental or physical
infirmities, from performing the duties of his office. Issues concerning
retirement for disability shall be initiated by motion of the attorney
general to the Supreme Court for investigation concerning the permanent disability of such judge, whereupon said court may appoint
a referee who shall have authority to subpoena witnesses and make
full investigation and submit his report thereeon to the court. In the
event the court shall determine such judge to be so permanently disabled, he shall be retired with such pension or retirement benefits
as he would have received had he fully completed his then term of
office. Upon such retirement his office shall be deemed vacant and be
filled as provided by law.

A third provision of importance in the proposed constitutional amendment is designed to place certain restrictions upon
the political activities of judges of the District and Supreme Courts.
This is in line with the general objective of obtaining and maintaining qualified men on the bench. Recognizing our present system of political selection of judges, it was felt nevertheless that
a judge should refrain, during his term of office, from active participation in political matters. The following provision, therefore,
is proposed for inclusion in Section 18:
* * * No judge of the District Court or Supreme Court shall accept
nomination for any public office other than judicial, the term of which
shall begin more than 30 days before the end of his term of office,
without first resigning from his judicial office, nor shall he engage
in the practice of law, nor shall he hold office in a political party
organization.
IMPROVEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION OF THE COURTS

Judicial Department Bill
The second proposed change in the Colorado laws is the suggested statute, referred to in this article as the Judicial Department Bill. This bill is designed to meet problems primarily of an
administrative nature. It is in the administrative field that Colorado appears at the greatest disadvantage in the comparisons madE
between all the states in Judge Vanderbilt's book. The American
Bar Association standard adopted in this connection is as follows:
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That provision should be made in each state for a unified judicial
system with power and responsibility in one of the judges to assign
judges to judicial service, so as to relieve congestion of dockets and
utilize the available judges to the best advantage.

The framers of the Colorado Constitution foresaw the need
for an organized and unified court system in the state. They also
apparently intended that power of the sort referred to in the
above quoted standard should be recognized and vested in the
judges of the Supreme Court. In Section 2 of our Constitution
is found this language:
The Supreme Court * * * shall have a general superintending
control over all inferior courts, under such regulations and limitations
as may be prescribed by law.

It is to carry into effect this intent as expressed in the Constitution that the so-called Judicial Department Bill has been prepared.
First, let us look at our present situation in Colorado. We
have at the present time 15 districts for our district courts within
which a total of 29 district judges hold office. We have 63 county
courts, each with one county judge. There is no attempt made
at the present time to correlate the activities of any of these courts
nor to observe or improve their respective performances.
In the face of this situation it was determined that a bill
should be prepared which would at last make effective the "superintending control" over inferior courts vested by the Constitution
in the Supreme Court. The Judicial Department Bill attempts to
gather together the various lines of feasible and tested administrative control which have been used elsewhere with good result.
These include the things mentioned in the above quoted standardi.e., "responsibility in one of the judges to assign judges * * * to
relieve congestion of dockets," and the development of a "unified
judicial system." The bill also provides the necessary means to
these ends-i.e., the gathering and study of reports on the work
of each court, including its docket condition, its cost and the general handling of its business. The American Bar Association considered these when it adopted its third standard respecting court
administration: "That quarterly judicial statistics should be required."
Finally, the bill provides for the organization to study these
reports, which working with the Chief Justice, shall recommend
to the legislature and other governmental bodies the improvements
and reforms which such continuing research should suggest. In
this last provision, the bill brings Colorado up to the remaining
standard adopted by the ABA as follows:
That Judicial Councils should be strengthened with representation accorded the Bar and Judiciary Committees of the Legislative
Department.
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We turn now to considering in detail these three basic standards relating to the efficient and modern administration of the
court system, and the detailed provisions proposed in the bill.
1.

Assignment of Trial Judges.

Vanderbilt, discussing Colorado and other states which have
no present provisions for transferring judges from court to court
by any responsible authority, has this to say:
In the first group are those states that have substantially no
element of external control in their judicial system. In such states
the spirit of independence and love of decentralization prevail, there
are no unifying elements, and reliance is placed entirely on voluntary efforts on the part of the judges to manage the shifts that are
required by changes in the judicial case load.

That there are shifts in judicial case loads is undeniable. That
there are inequalities in the ordinary work pressure upon the
various trial courts of the state is equally unquestionable. The
only question therefore is, how shall we solve these problems and
equalize this load? There are two basic alternatives. One is our
present haphazard method of invitation and, perhaps, voluntary
acceptance. An overloaded judge, under this system, must attempt
to set cases at a time convenient to counsel, witnesses, litigants,
jury terms and finally to the wishes of the judge he hopes will
help him. The second alternative is that proposed by the American
Bar Association and borne out by successful experience in many
states, as well as in the Federal court system. This is to empower
some judge, usually of a higher court, to direct trial judges to
assist in other courts in accordance with need. The judge with
this power has access to information necessary to enable him to
exercise this power properly. He knows not only the condition
of the docket of the court needing assistance, but that of the judge
who is directed to assist. The mere statement of the alternatives
obviates the necessity for argument.
Another obstacle now impeding even our present voluntary
system is the inadequacy of expense money provided for travelling
judges both within and without their own districts. Even our
voluntary arrangement would work better if the judge accepting
the invitation to sit elsewhere were assured of doing so without
financial loss. To remedy this situation, the Colorado Bar Association proposes a third piece of legislation-the Expense Bill,
which provides $20.00 per day for expenses for a judge sitting
temporarily away from home, and also mileage at the rate of 10c
per mile. This should reduce the difficulty of inducing judges to
accept invitations to sit elsewhere and should reduce the present
problem exemplified by one district judge who asked more than
15 judges to assist him, without a single acceptance.
The suggested solution in the Judicial Department Bill works
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as follows: The state will be divided into Judicial Departmentsnot more than six in number-and in charge of each department
and all the trial courts therein will be one judge. This Departmental
Judge (Supreme Court judge if available and willing to undertake
it-otherwise a district judge) shall have the power to assign
judges from one trial court to another within his department. The
Chief Departmental Judge (probably the Chief Justice, but if he
is unwilling to undertake the duties, some other Justice of the
Supreme Court) is the only one with power to assign judges across
departmental boundaries. Thus, under this plan, routine assignments will be limited for any particular judge to a relatively small
area of the state, and only in cases of more serious emergency
will he be called upon to travel any great distance.
2. The Gathering of Judicial Statistics.
It is easy to ridicule statistics and statisticians. Much easier
in fact than it is to formulate any sensible program without them.
It should go without saying that any business operation of the
importance and scope of the judicial system should have carefully
kept records as to the conduct of its business. And yet, though
many courts in Colorado keep such careful records and statistics,
there is no correlation of these records in any one place and no
clearing house for their analysis and use. Our present system is
virtually useless except from a purely local standpoint. It is as
though a bank were to allow each teller to keep records, or not, as
he saw fit, without ever attempting to gather them together for
an examination of the overall picture.
The proposed Judicial Department Bill attacks this problem
in this way: It requires each court in a Department to report at
least annually to the Departmental Judge. Where necessary, it
permits the Departmental Judge to make his own independent
examination of any court's records and business. It further requires annual conferences of all the judges in a department to
discuss and study the problems of their respective courts. At these
conferences representatives of the bar may also appear and participate in the reports and discussion.
From the material obtained at these conferences and from the
individual court records and reports, the Departmental Judge
must make up his own report to the Chief Departmental Judge.
This judge then analyzes and studies the reports from the various
departments and files them as public records.
Such reports, available to the press and the public, will furnish for the first time a criterion upon which the performance of
the particular courts may be judged. Likewise, they will furnish
the necessary basis for continuing study and for recommendations
for improvement. Instead of having to rely upon the piecemeal
and sporadic studies of occasional voluntary committees of the
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bar or the lay public-which may generate enough enthusiasm to
support some improvement every quarter century or so the work
of the courts will be subject to constant and informed scrutiny.
Changes and improvements may thus be made from time to time
before they are made necessary by some scandal or emergency
situation. Those courts which are performing their duties and
dispatching their business efficiently and well would, of course,
welcome this scrutiny and the continuing improvement thus made
possible. Those falling behind in their work would for the first
time have the benefit of the experience of the more successful ones
and would have an opportunity to correct their condition before it
became serious. Only those courts, if indeed there should be any,
who had no ambition to perform their important duties ably and
well and who merely wished to draw their compensation, unearned
and inconspicuously, would have anything to fear from the proposed plan. Such courts of course should be exposed and restaffed.
3. The Research Organization.
The third thing of importance in the American Bar Association's analysis of the minimum standards for efficient administration of a judicial system is the creation of an organization devoted
to the continuing study of the workings of the courts. We have
already referred to the present lack of any such organization in
Colorado. Here, as elsewhere, there have been occasional attempts
by volunteer committees to study these problems and to recommend reforms. The Judiciary Committee of the Colorado Bar Association is an example of this sort of effort. However, such a
volunteer committee, lacking any permanent organization or any
governmental standing, cannot possess the continuity nor furnish
the continuing effort such an organization should require.
Many states, recognizing this problem, have created Judicial
Councils in a variety of forms. Some of these have been eminently
successful; others have accomplished practically nothing. The
Judicial Department Bill proposed by the Colorado Bar Association
represents an attempt to create a research organization modeled
along the lines of those which have been most successful elsewhere.
The factors which seem to be important in the success of such
an organization include:
1. That it be composed of representatives of the community
at large and not solely of the bar or bench.
2. That it have access to the sort of statistics and reports
which we have discussed above.
3. That it be small enough to be efficient.
Judicial Councils which have met these requirements have had
conspicuous success in obtaining public and legislative approval
of their recommendations. Several such councils have succeeded
in having the great majority of their recommendations enacted
into law.
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It is apparent that the success of such a council must depend
largely upon the prestige which it is able to develop. It therefore
is of highest importance that the men chosen to sit upon this council shall be chosen solely on the basis of their ability, integrity and
ideals, and not because of their prominence in any partisan political field.
The Judicial Council proposed in the Judicial Department Bill
would consist of eight members. Representing the bench there
would be one district judge selected by the District Judges Association and one county judge selected by the County Judges Association. The legislature would be represented by the chairmen
of the Judiciary Committees of the state Senate and House. The
bar would be represented by two lawyers chosen by the Colorado
Bar Association and the lay public by two laymen appointed by
the Governor. Terms of members of the council would be staggered
and would be long enough so as to prevent any one person or
organization from "packing" the council to accomplish any special
purpose. This council would serve without pay, but a position on
this council should be regarded as a public duty of highest importance and a position of honor.
The council would meet with the Chief Justice for the purpose of studying the reports obtained from the various courts in
the state as well as any substantive or procedural changes in the
law which might be brought to the council's attention. Although
the proposed bill does not limit the scope of the council's study
to any particular field, it is probably a reasonable prediction that
it would tend to limit itself primarily to matters concerning the
administration of justice and the functioning of the court system.
From the meetings between the Chief Justice and the council
would come recommendations for improvements as such improvements appear necessary or advisable.
Additional Compensation for DepartmentalJudges
It is apparent that the scope of the duties imposed by the
Judicial Department Bill upon the various departmental judges
is extensive. It is, therefore, appropriate that this bill contain
provision for additional compensation to those judges who undertake these duties. Accordingly, the bill provides for a maximum
salary of $3,500 a year to be paid to the departmental judges in
addition to their salaries received for the judicial duties. The
top limit of $10,000 is set for Supreme Court Judges for the combination of their two salaries. Thus, this proposed bill accomplishes a dual result. In addition to setting up what we hope will
be an efficient administrative and research organization for the
courts of Colorado, it will also fill the very serious need of making
possible additional compensation for the judges of the Supreme
Court to bring them more nearly back in line with their approriate relative position in the state government. Also, it would
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make possible the elimination of the present inequity whereby the
junior judges on the Supreme Court receive a thousand dollars
more per year than the senior judges who were elected prior to
the passage of the last salary increase.
It is shocking to observe that there are well over a hundred
state officials and employees receiving as much as or more than
the judges of the Supreme Court. The office of Supreme Court
judge should have a standing at least equal that of Governor. The
compensation, likewise, should reflect this equality. Instead, at
the present time, all judges of the Supreme Court receive far less
than the Governor, less than the Highway Engineer, the head of
the state hospital, the presidents of all of the state colleges, and
less than various teachers, football coaches and empolyees of the
state colleges, to mention only a few. Several of the judges of the
Supreme Court receive less than various minor employees of the
health department, the highway department, the public welfare
department and, for example, the head of the engineering drawing department and music teachers at the University of Colof~ado.
This is not to say that the ones listed above are being overpaid,
but rather that the Supreme Court judges are being greviously
underpaid. If a good football coach can't be obtained for less than
$8,500 a year, it may be reasonable to assume that it is also difficult to induce the best qualified attorney in the state to give up
his practice and become a Supreme Court judge for $6,500 or
$7,500. This is said with all due respect to football fans.
COUNTY COURT-JUSTICE COURT BILL

Much has been written concerning the problem of the courts
of small jurisdiction. Any thoughtful attorney has recognized the
fact that these courts, though handling matters of small financial
importance, have great importance in the community. Virtually
all groups which have given study to this problem have recognized
that these courts should be staffed by competent and honest judges,
and that the same principles of justice which apply in the major
courts should be used in the courts of limited jurisdiction. It is
fair to say that the only contact with any court had by the great
majority of the population is with the court of limited jurisdiction.
It is apparent, therefore, that this great majority of the population is going to form its opinion of the entire judiciary system on
the basis of what is observed in the smaller courts. Even more
far reaching in importance, the public is going to form its attitude towards the laws generally, and its respect or disrespect for
law, on the basis of whether or not real justice can be obtained in
these small courts. The problem of improving these courts, therefore, affecting as it does the public's attitude toward law and the
administration of justice, is one of major importance for the bar.
The Justice of the Peace courts have not proved to be an ade-

January, 1951

DICTA

quate solution to this problem. As Judge Vanderbilt says in his
book, almost without exception any organization that has ever
studied the justice of the peace system has recommended its abolition. This same conclusion was reached by the Judiciary Committee
of the Colorado Bar Association more than two years ago. Accordingly, the County Court Bill was prepared. This bill would abolish
the justice courts and transfer the jurisdiction now handled by
the justice courts to the county judge and assistants under his
supervision and direction.
Obviously, the mere transfer of jurisdiction from one court
to another, without more, would not constitute any improvement
or any solution for the problem that exists. Unless the court to
which the jurisdiction is transferred is a better court, no improvement will have been accomplished.
In this connection there would seem to be little question as
to the superiority of the county courts over the justice courts at
the present time. Furthermore, the proposed County Court Bill
aims towards more strict requirements as to the qualifications of
county judges. Both lawyers and laymen are usually quite shocked
and surprised when they learn that a great many of the county
judges in Colorado are not lawyers. This, of course, does not
necessarily mean that some of the county judges not admitted to
the bar are not doing creditable jobs. Nevertheless, as long as any
legal procedures are followed and as long as the primary business
of the judge is to interpret and apply the laws, it seems unarguable that the judges should be "learned in the law." For this reason, the County Court Bill provides that all county judges in counties over 10,000 population must have been admitted to practice
law in Colorado. The only reason that this provision does not
extend to all counties is that some of the counties of population
smaller than 10,000 have no resident lawyers and, hence, would
have no person within their boundaries who could qualify for the
office. Needless to say, the statute will not remove any incumbent
county judge who does not meet these qualifications, before the
completion of his present term.
Having insured insofar as possible that the county judges
will be men or women with a background and experience in law,
the County Court Bill then provides for the assumption of justice
court jurisdiction by the county courts. In many counties this
extra load may be handled without undue difficulty by the county
judge without further assistance. However, in the more populous
counties or in counties of greater physical area, the county judge
will not be able to handle this additional load unaided. Therefore,
the bill provides that magistrates may be appointed by the county
judge to handle cases which formerly have come within bounds
of the justice court's jurisdictional limits. The permissive number
of these magistrates is governed by the population of the county,
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there being one permitted for each county of a population over
20,000 and an additional one for each additional 30,000 or part
thereof in excess of 50,000. Furthermore, in any county, regardless of population, the Chief Justice may approve the appointment
of one or more magistrates to take care of exceptional conditions.
All magistrates will operate under the control and supervision of
the county judge who will be held responsible for the conduct of
their courts.
Still another problem with respect to the county courts arises
in two or three of our biggest counties where at the present time
one county judge is unable to handle the load of probate, divorce
and, in some instances, juvenile work presently imposed upon him.
For such counties the County Court Bill provides that the office
of assistant county judge may be created. This office will be filled
by election or appointment in the same manner as the office of
county judge and the person holding this office must have the same
qualifications as the county judge. In effect, this simply creates
additional divisions for the county court where needed, and assistant county judges shall have jurisdiction identical to that of the
county judge. The county judge in such counties shall act as the
presiding judge.
By its terms the bill provides that the abolition of the justice
court shall not take effect until six months from the passage of
the bill. This six months' period may be used by the Supreme Court
to formulate rules of procedure to govern the handling of the
former justice court business by the county judges and their magistrates. This procedure should take account of the present low
cost of justice court proceedings and should carry over that feature into the new arrangement.
It is hoped that when this system is put into operation the
experience with it will be such that any citizen may count upon
a fair and impartial trial by an able judge, whether his case involves ten dollars or ten thousand dollars. Even more important
to the repute of justice in the state is the handling of the criminal
jurisdiction which is presently in the hands of Justices of the
Peace. This jurisdiction may be belittled by calling it simply misdemeanor jurisdiction and yet it carries with it the power in the
judge to deprive a man of liberty for any period up to a year.
This is scarcely a trivial matter.
SALARY BILLS

Two bills have not yet been completely prepared, but have
been approved in principle by the Board of Governors of the bar
association. When completed they will represent the bar's effort
to see that members of the bench are paid in accordance with modern economic conditions and in accordance with the importance
of their public duties.
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1. District Court Salary Bill

It is proposed to recommend to the legislature a bill which
would raise the salaries of district judges throughout the state to
$8,000. This would represent a raise of $2,000 above their present salaries. This raise is justified not only by the change in economic conditions and the reduction in the purchasing value of the
dollar, but also by the fact that under the Judicial Department
Bill, district judges throughout the state will be doing more nearly
equal amounts of work by reason of their service in other districts
when required.
It has also been recognized by those who have given thought
to the problem that there perhaps may be some difference in
salary needs from one community or district to another. For example, it was the feeling of the Denver Bar Association that the
salary of the district judges in Denver should be raised to $12,000
a year and that this represented the minimum figure which would
give hope of attracting to the district bench the men best qualified
to hold that position. The figure is not out of line with cities in
other states, comparable to Denver in size and in volume of judicial business. In fact, it may still be said to be on the low side.
To make provision for such special situations there is under
discussion a proposal that the salary bill empower any district that
sees fit to supplement the $8,000 salary with any additional amount
deemed appropriate, provided that such additional amount shall
be paid out of county funds in the district concerned rather than
out of state funds. If adopted, this may result in the salaries of
some district judges being greater than others. This, however,
is no new principle since the salaries of county judges have always
been graduated in accordance with the classification of the county
and range from a few hundred dollars a year in the smallest
county to $7,000 a year in Denver. Likewise, the principle of
allowing both state and county to contribute toward the aggregate
salary of a public official is not new. This practice has been followed with respect to district attorneys for a long time.
2. County Court Salary Bill
The proposed bill covering salaries of county judges is under
study at the present time by the Judiciary Committee of the Colorado Bar Association. The details as to amount of salary increases
to be recommended have not been finally worked out. However
the committee and the Board of Governors are committed to the
principle that a substantial raise should be recommended for all
county judges. Here again this is justified not only by economic
conditions but by the considerably greater workload and responsibility that will be transferred to the county courts if the justice
courts are abolished as proposed.
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COLORADO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DOES IT
MEET THE MINIMUM STANDARDS?
AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.
Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law

The American Bar Association at its annual meeting in 1938
made a number of specific recommendations for the improvement
of the administration of justice in the United States.' Although
these recommendations are not limited to matters of judicial procedure, 2 most of them do deal with procedure, both civil and criminal. It is the purpose of this article to examine the American Bar
Association's recommendations for the improvement of criminal
procedure, and to see to what extent3 Colorado complies with the
recommended procedure in this field.
The recommendations in question do not purport to cover procedure in any detail. Instead they pick out a few items considered
really essential to the proper administration of justice in modern
times-items which, while they represent the minimum requirements for achieving justice, are yet of
a practical, rather than
4
simply theoretical or academic, nature.
The first recommendation of the American Bar Association,
"that practice and procedure in the courts should be regulated
by rules of court; and that to this end the courts should be given
full rule-making powers," is called the "keystone" of the association's program for reform of judicial procedure. 5 This recom' These recommendations, as well as the committee reports on which they were
based, may be found in 63 A.B.A_ REP. 522-656 (1938), and in VANDERBILT, MINIMUM
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, 505-624 (1949). The history of these recommendations is as follows: The ABA's Section of Judicial Administration undertook to make
specific recommendations for reform of judicial administration. It obtained the services
of seven committees of distinguished lawyers, judges and professors to report on seven
principal sub-topics (judicial administration; pre-trial procedure; trial practice; selection of jurors; law of evidence; appellate practice; and administrative agencies). These
committees made specific proposals to the section, which adopted most of them in its
recommendations to the House of Delegates. The House adopted all these recommendations at the annual convention.
I They include recommendations for improvement of justice (1)
through better
selection of judges; (2) through better integration of the judiciary by the establishment
of judicial councils, administrative offices, administrative judges, etc. ; and (3) through
improvement of administrative tribunals and practice. As to the methods of selection of
judges in Colorado, and their conformity to A.B.A. standards, see Van Cise, The Colorado Judicial System-Can
it and Should it be Improved?, 22 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 142
(1950).
' Two recent publications are very helpful for understanding the ABA's minimum
standards and the reasons therefor, and for seeing how far each of the states complies
with these standards. They are: VANDERBILT, op. cit. note 1 supra; and AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1949) a handbook
prepared by the Section of Judicial Administration. I have one criticism of both works
(and indeed of the wording of the ABA recommendations) : they do not always make
clear which recommendations apply to criminal procedure as well as to civil procedure.
For instance, does the recommendation for pre-trial conferences, or that for partial new
trials, apply to criminal as well as civil cases?
4 Judge Vanderbilt lays great stress on the fact that the recommendations deal with
minimum standards of practical application, and not something academic and utopian.
VANDERBILT, OP. cit. note 1, at xxviii.
I A.B.A. HANDBOOK, Op. cit. note 3 supra, at 8.
By the rule-making power, a somewhat ambiguous expression, the ABA means: (1)
A complete power, not merely a
power to supplement legislative rules of procedure. In case of conflict between legislative rule and court rule, the latter prevails. (2)
A supervisory power in one court-the
court of last resort-to
make rules governing procedure in other courts. VANDERBILT,
op. cit note 1, at 92, 94.
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mendation is not, of course, limited to the field of civil procedure
but embraces criminal procedure as well. 6 Colorado lawyers are
familiar with the state legislature's statutory recognition in 1939
of the Colorado Supreme Court's right to prescribe rules of procedure for civil cases in the Colorado courts, 7 soon thereafter followed by the court's adoption in 1941 of the Colorado Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Colorado legislature has in recent times
passed no such statute relative to the rule-making power of the
court over criminal procedure.
RULE-MAKING POWER INHERENT IN COURTS

It is doubtless true that the Colorado Supreme Court may
properly promulgate rules of criminal procedure without such a
statute. The regulation of procedure in the courts is inherently
a judicial rather than a legislative function,8 and this power to
regulate has not been lost through abandonment merely because
the court has not exercised it as much as it might have done.9
Furthermore, the Colorado constitution specifically provides that
the Supreme Court has "a general superintending control over all
inferior courts;" 10 this provision is broad enough to include the
rule-making power." Lastly, the Colorado legislature as long ago
as 1913 expressly recognized the Supreme Court's right to prescribe rules of criminal procedure. 12 It might be well, however,
for the Colorado legislature to enact a statute at the instigation
of the Colorado Bar Association expressly conferring on the Supreme Court the rule-making power in the criminal field.
There are many advantages to court-made rules of procedure
over legislature-made rules. Courts know more about procedure
than do members of the legislature. They can better withstand
harmful influences by interested groups. They can make needed
changes from time to time more quickly and easily than can the
legislature. Legislative changes are almost always piece-meal,
patchwork affairs, but the courts may promulgate a well-rounded,
complete, cohesive set of rules. The truth of this last statement
may be tested by comparing the present confusing state of the
law of criminal procedure in Colorado, contained in various scattered statutes, Supreme Court decisions and unwritten practices
a See A.B.A. HANDBOOK, op. cit. note 3, at 12. Note that the United States Congress authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of criminal procedure, 54 STAT.
688 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1948) in a separate statute from that authorizing rules
of civil procedure, 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1948). The Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure became effective on Mar. 21, 1946, seven years after the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure went into effect.
'COLO. LAWS 1939, p. 264.
VANDERBILT, op. cit. note 1, supra, at 132-134. The Colorado Supreme Court has
so held : Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575 (1931).
9

See Kolkman v. People, note 8 supra.

CoL~o. CONST. Art. VI, § 2.
11 Kolkman v. People, note 8 supra. VANDERBILT, op. cit. note 1, supra, at 135-6.
12 COLO. LAWS 1913, p. 447. The statute provides that the Colorado Supreme Court
may make rules of procedure in all courts of record, which rules shall supersede any
statute in conflict therewith. While not expressly *mentioning criminal procedure, it
includes it by inference, since it is not limited to civil procedure.
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in trial courts, 13 with the much shorter and simpler but more complete statement of the law in the new Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
The power to make rules of criminal procedure is not, of
course, an end in itself but only a means to an end; that is, a
means of improving the administration of justice in criminal cases.
The court, having such a power, must take some action. What
action? It should appoint a committee of lawyers to draw up rules
14
of criminal procedure, as it did for the rules of civil procedure.
It seems clear that, with very little actual change in Colorado
criminal procedure, much can be done to simplify, consolidate and
make more certain the present law, to prune away some obsolete
provisions and to incorporate some of the procedural changes recommended by the American Bar Association, 15 which are to be
discussed in the remainder of this article. The rules committee
would have the great benefit of having not only the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, but also the American Law Institute Code' 6
and these American Bar Association recommendations, to serve
as aids in formulating the best possible rules of criminal procedure.
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCES

The American Bar Association recommended that trial courts
should utilize the pre-trial conference, especially in metropolitan
areas.' 7 It is not clear whether this recommendation is meant to
apply to criminal, as well as civil, cases. It would seem to be a
useful device in the criminal field, to achieve, for instance, a simplification of the issues, or to obtain possible admissions of fact
or of documents and thus avoid the necessity of proof at the trial.
It has sometimes been used in criminal cases in other states.', The
Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
proposed a pre-trial conference in criminal cases, based on Rule
16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 19 but the United States
Supreme Court omitted the provision when it adopted the Rules.
Colorado apparently has no provision for pre-trial conferences in
criminal cases.
There has in recent times been a good deal of criticism of the
institution of trial by jury. Many persons, especially laymen, believe that the jury trial today is not a search for truth and justice
at all, but rather a contest between lawyers endeavoring to fool
the jury into giving a favorable verdict. If this ancient institution
is to survive in modern times, it must serve as a proper instru'3 See Scott, Criminal Procedure in
Colorado-A Summary; and Recommendations
for Improvement, 22 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 221, 246 (1950).
14 The methods used successfully by the Colorado Supreme Court in preparing civil
rules, by appointing a committee to prepare a draft, followed by an invitation to members of bench and bar to submit criticisms, were substantially those used by the United
States Supreme Court to draw up the Federal Rules both of Civil and Criminal Procedure.
15 That is the recommendations of 63 A.B.A. REP. 522 (1938). cited at note 1, supra.
'sAMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1930).
" 63 A.B.A. REP. at 523 (1938).
"ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM.\TARREST TO APPEAL, 323-4 (1947).
"Similar to COLO. R. CIv. P. 16 (1941).
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ment for achieving justice. The American Bar Association lays
great stress on the necessity for improving the caliber of the jury
panel through improved methods of selecting jurors, in most states
a very haphazard affair. While it is important not to discriminate
against any social, economic, religious or racial group in selecting
jurors, it is equally important to get intelligent, sensible, highminded persons for jury service.
The first recommendation as to jury selection is that "jurors
should be selected by commissioners appointed by the courts" 20
on a non-partisan basis. Colorado fulfills this "minimum standard" only in part: for counties over 40,000 in population it is
of smaller size jury selection is made by county
true2 ; for counties
22
commissioners.
Since the primary purpose of the jury commissioner system
is to improve the caliber of the jury, "the commissioner should
have authority to send out questionnaires, conduct personal interviews, give intelligence tests and use other procedures to determine
the fitness of those under consideration; and, of course, he should
have sufficient funds and clerical assistance to enable him to do
a thorough job." 23 The Colorado laws allow the jury commissioner
to send questionnaires and conduct personal interviews as to the
qualifications of prospective jurors, 24 but do not direct or authorize a thorough investigation of their general fitness for the task.
DISCRETIONARY POWER IN JUDGE PREFERRED

While the American Bar Association in its 1938 recommendation did not cover this matter, it has since adopted, as part of its
program of law reform, the recommendation of the Knox committee on jury selection to the effect that state jury laws should provide for a liberal standard of qualifications for jury service with
few exemptions, with discretion in the trial judge to excuse particular individuals or groups from serving. 25 Colorado is one of
states which substantially follow this Knox recommendathe few
26
tion.
One bad feature of the Colorado law on jury selection is the
statutory provision, explaining the duties of the jury selection
officials, to the effect that these officials shall list only those qualified persons who are not exempt.2 7 In effect this disqualifies the
are qualified even though
exempt persons, although exempt persons
2
they need not serve if they do not wish.
Two other recommendations of the American Bar Association
20 63 A.B.A. REP, at 525 (1938).
2' COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 95, §§ 22, 36 (1935).
2Id. § 10, as amended by COLO. LAWS 1943, p. 390.
23A.B.A. HANDBOOK, Op. cit. note 3, supra, at 63.
24 COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 95, §§ 26, 40 (1935).
1 A.B.A. HANDBOOK, Op. cit. note 3. suprao. at 62.
7COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 95, § 1 (1935), as amended by COLO. LAWS 1945, p. 426
(repealing C. 95, H9 3-9). Some exemptions are found scattered about in the statutes,
e.g. id. c. 95, § 15, exempting those who served within a year; id. c. 111, §§ 23, 136 (as
amended) exempting national and state guardsmen.
7Id. c. 95, §§ 10 (as amended by COLO. LAWS 1943, p. 390), 25, 39.
m Criticized in VANDERBILT, op. cit. note 1, supra, at 171.
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have to do with juries. First, the proposal that on the examination
of jurors on their voir dire the procedure of Rule 47 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure-having the initial questioning of jurors
done by the trial judge, and giving him control over later questioning by counsel-should be followed. This procedure, designed to
avoid delay in selecting the trial jury, is not followed in civil cases
in Colorado, 2f nor is there any authority for it in Colorado criminal cases. Second, the proposal that alternate jurors be impanelled
in order to avoid mistrials as a result of the death or unavoidable
absence of a regular juror during a long trial. Colorado fulfills
this "minimum standard" in criminal,3 0 as well as civil, 31 cases.
The important problem of improving the administration of
justice by the selection of jurors of higher quality is, of course,
only partly a question of changing the law. Most of the results
must be achieved through more business-like practices of the jury
selection officials, coupled with a greater recognition by the public
of their duty to aid in the administration of justice by serving
as jurors, rather than thinking of excuses not to serve.
TRIAL PRACTICE

The American Bar Association makes a number of recommendations in this general field. The most important of these are
aimed at restoring the power of the trial judge to what it was at
common law, by (1) allowing him to give oral instructions to the
jury after argument by counsel and (2) giving him the power, in
instructing the jury, of "summarizing and analyzing the evidence
and commenting upon the weight and credibility of the evidence
or upon any part of it, always leaving the final decision on questions of fact to the jury." 32 These powers are, of course, nothing
new and revolutionary, but rather of ancient origin. 33 The American Bar Association felt strongly that possession of these powers
by the trial judge is necessary for the proper administration of
justice, i. e., the reaching of a just result. 34 The right to analyze
and comment on the evidence is necessary at times when counsel
deliberately try to cloud the issues or play on the emotions of the
jurors. Written instructions are singularly unenlightening, and
their usefulness is often greatly diminished if followed by, rather
than following, arguments of counsel.
In this area of procedure, both civil and criminal, Colorado
measures up badly. In civil cases the judge may not comment on
the evidence; it is expressly forbidden by the Colorado Rules of
' COLO. R.

Civ. P.

court permission.

47(a)

(1941),

allowing counsel to question the Jurors without

S COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 95, § 21 (1935).
"Id.
Also Co Lo. R. Civ. P. 47(b) (1941).
63 A.B.A. REP at 523.
"VANDERBILT, Op. Cit. note 1, at 224-5.
'4 The same proposals are made in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, RULE 8 (1942), and in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
§ 325 (1930). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51, and the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Rule 30, provide for Instructions after argument. Comment on the
evidence has always been allowed in practice in civil and criminal cases in Federal
courts, although not expressly mentioned in the Federal rules.
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Civil Procedure. 35 While there is no statute or rule expressly forbidding comment in criminal cases, such is probably the present
law in Colorado3 6 Instructions are given in writing, rather than
orally, in both civil 37 and criminal 38 cases, and 3the
instructions
9
precede, rather than follow, arguments of counsel.
As the American Bar Association has pointed out, "These
changes will not automatically produce a just verdict in every case.
But they will make it more likely that a right verdict will be returned." 40 Colorado should take action to improve its procedure
in this area.
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES TO THE JURY RECOMMENDED

The ABA makes some other recommendations in the field of
trial practice, some of which may be applicable to criminal trials.
One recommendation is for the authorized use of special interrogatories to the jury along with the general verdict. 4 1 Colorado,
although it authorizes the use of such special verdicts in civil
cases, 42 makes no such provision as to criminal cases. It is allowed
in some states for criminal cases.43 Doubtless its use in both civil
and criminal cases may help to make juries decide according to the
law, preventing them from taking the law into their own hands. 44
Another recommendation is that trial courts should have the
power, after verdict, of granting a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, in accordance with an original motion for
directed verdict. 4 This would save the time and expense of an
unnecessary new trial. Colorado follows this recommendation in
civil cases.4 6 On principle, the rule should apply equally to criminal cases, where the evidence on behalf of the prosecution, even
if assumed to be true, is insufficient to prove that the defendant
committed the crime charged, but the trial judge erroneously has
refused to direct a verdict of acquittal. After verdict of guilty,
the judge could grant a new trial because of the insufficiency of
the evidence; but why should there be a new trial at all? The
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure give the trial judge this
" COLO. R. Civ. P. 51 (1941). The 1939 statute, note 7 supra, authorizing the
Supreme Court to prescribe rules of civil procedure, provides "that no rule shall be made
permitting or allowing trial judges to comment on the evidence given on the trial." For
a similar restraint, see also COLO. LAWS 1913, p. 447.
See Scott, note 13 supra, at 239-40.
"COLO. R. Civ. P. 51 (1941).
Coio. STAT. ANN., C. 48, § 491 (1935). If both parties agree, the instructions, submitted to the judge in writing. may be given by him orally. Id. § 492.
"Id.
c. 48, § 491 (criminal) ; COLO. R. Civ. P. 51 (1941)
(civil).
"A.B.A. I-ANDBOOK, Op. cit. note 3 supra, at 53.
"63 A.B.A. REP. at 524 (1938).
"COLO. R. Civ. P. 49 (1941).
a See ORFIELD, op. cit. note 18 supra, 472-3. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, §§ 337, 341-2 (1930), provides for special verdicts. They were
allowed in criminal cases at common law. Id. p. 1000-1. The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure are silent on the question.
'4 "The general verdict Is an escape-valve from the hardships
of fixed law, but it
can be abused when juries disregard the law generally and follow prejudice and personal favor." A.B.A. HANDBOOK, op. cit. note 3 supra, at 53.
63 A.B.A. REP. at 524 (1938). This, of course, is not the old common law motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which raised questions as to the sufficiency
of the pleadings but not of the evidence.
"COLO.
R. Civ. P. 50(b) (1941).
See also FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (1939).
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power, 47 and a number of states allow this procedure in criminal
cases. 48 Although there is nothing in the Colorado statutes expressly giving the Colorado trial judge in a criminal case49 this
power, very likely he nevertheless does have such a power.
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

We have already considered under the heading "trial practice" one or two of the ABA recommendations dealing with evidence, such as the trial judge's power to comment on the evidence.
Some other proposals are made, however, for reforming the rules
of evidence in the interests of better administration of justice.5 °
These proposals are applicable to evidence in both civil and criminal cases.
One rather general but basic recommendation is that more
than mere error in the admission or rejection of evidence should
be required for the granting of a new trial by an appellate court.
There must also be some showing that, on the whole record, the
error resulted in prejudice to the losing party. This is the Colorado law in both civil 51 and criminal 52 cases. Another recommendation is that formal exceptions to the trial court's adverse
rulings on evidence should not be a prerequisite for review on appeal.
Colorado clearly does not require exceptions in 54civil cases, 53 but
the law is not stated clearly as to criminal cases.
The other proposals for reforming the law of evidence deal
with certain specific rules picked out from the total body of rules
of evidence as particularly needing change. 55 It is worthy of note
that the reform of evidence is not really a matter for a committee
drafting rules of procedure, 56 but is 57such a special job that it
should be done as a separate venture.
One of the ABA's recommendations concerning appellate practice 58 is that, to avoid unnecessary expenditures of time and money,
appeals from inferior courts by trials de novo in a superior court
be abolished, and justice of the peace courts either be done away
with or improved. Colorado, of course, has a system of justice
courts, and in criminal cases a defendant convicted in the justice
court may appeal to the county court, where a trial de novo is had.5 9
FED. R. CRIM. P.
48see ORFIELD, op.
4,

29 (1946).

cit. note 18 supra. at 436.
,9 The Colorado Supreme Court may reverse and remand with directions to sustain a
motion to acquit and discharge the defendant, where the evidence on the state's part is
so defective that the trial judge should have directed a verdict. E.g Matthews v. People,
89 Colo. 421, 3 P. 2d 409 (1931). See Scott, note 13 supra, at 244-5. This being so, it
should follow that the trial judge can give judgment of acquittal after verdict of guilty,
where the evidence is so defective that the trial judge should have directed a verdict.
5163 A.B.A. REP. at 525-527 (1938).
Z COLO. R. Civ. P. 61 (1941) ("harmless error").
Accord as to harmless error in federal criminal
52 See Scott, note 13 svpra, at 244.
cases, see FED. R. CRiM. P. 52(a) (1946).
53COLO. R. Civ. P. 46
(1941).
54Probably formal exceptions are not necessary. See Scott, note 13 supra, at 238.
55E.g. privileged communications; deceased person's statements; proof of business
records ; the opinion rule ; certified copies of court records.
M Thus the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure and the Colorado Rules of
Civil Procedure do not deal in any way with the specific rules of evidence.
.7 The American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence (1942) would be a natural
starting point in any venture of this kind.
563 A.B.A. REP. 527-9 (1938).
iiCOLO. STAT. ANN., c. 96 § 165 (1935).
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The recent attempts by the Colorado Bar Association to bring
about these recommended reforms 60 have not as yet borne fruit,
but a further attempt to carry them out may be expected.
Another recommendation deals with the superior qualities of
a simple notice of appeal, as distinguished from the old writ of
error, which has been abolished in most states today. Colorado
still retains the writ of error, both as to civil 61 and criminal 62
cases. Still other recommendations cover the record on appeal,
aimed primarily at reducing the cost of appeal, and, by making
appeal possible in some instances when it would otherwise be too
expensive, thus furthering the administration of justice. Thus,
typewritten records of court testimony should be permissible; the
papers and pleadings on file which are to be put in the record
need not be printed but may be used in their original form; and
printed abstracts should not be required. 63 Still further recommendations call for a limitation on the length of briefs with no
more than a certain number of pages to be taxable as costs, and
opinions when no new principle
the wider use of memorandum
64
of law is involved.
Just as there is a recommendation, discussed above under
"trial practice," that the trial judge be allowed after verdict to
give judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the appellate court
should have power to direct that verdict be entered for the defendant, rather than simply power to remand for new trial, on appeal
by the defendant from the trial judge's refusal to direct a verdict
of acquittal. The record may show not only that the trial judge
was wrong but what the correct judgment should be. This recommended procedure is followed in Colorado in criminal cases.6 5
CIVIL RULES GIVE COLORADO HIGH STANDING

In a recent issue of the American Bar Association Journal,
the 48 states were compared as to how they measured up to the
association's minimum standards of judicial administration. 6 The
comparison was admittedly somewhat rough and ready, but it
does give some indication of Colorado's relative standing. Colorado tied for fifth (along with Minnesota and New Hampshire)
behind New Jersey, California, Delaware and Wisconsin, in that
order. Two thoughts occur to me about Colorado's relatively high
showing. One is that the principal reason for such a showing is
60 See Johnson's articles in 25 DICTA on the Colorado Bar Association judiciary plan.
The Colorado legislature in the 1949 session failed to pass the proposal to amend the
judiciary article of the Colorado constitution, including the abolition of the justice

courts.
"' COLO. R. Civ. P. 111 (1941).

See explanation for retention of the writ at 1 COLO.

STAT.6 ANN., p. 531 (1941).
COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 48, §§ 497-500

(1935).

63Colorado requires abstracts in both civil cases, COLO. R. CiV. P. 115 (1941), and
criminal, COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 48, § 499 (1935), although sometimes the abstract may be
typewritten, COLO. R. Civ. P. 115 (1941).
It often
64 The Colorado Supreme Court has no definite limit on length of briefs.
renders memorandum opinions, as recommended.
65Matthews v. People, 89 Colo. 421. 3 P. 2d 409 (1931).
"Porter, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration: The Extent of Their Acceptance, 36 A.B.AJ. 614 (1950).
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Colorado's adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Her record
in the field of criminal procedure is not as good. The other thought
is that, while Colorado's standing is relatively high, it still falls
well-short of achieving the minimum standards discussed in this
article. In other words, it is not so much that Colorado is good as
that most of the other states are bad.
It seems to me obvious that Colorado should have a set of
modern, well-rounded, simply-stated Supreme Court Rules of
Criminal Procedure to take the place of the present confusing
array of scattered statutory provisions, court decisions, unwritten
practices, out-dated customs and general uncertainty. The changes
would be more of form than of substance, since most of the present
law of criminal procedure in Colorado is, once it has been found,
sensible enough. Some changes in substance can be made, however,
Colorado, as we have seen, does fall short of the "minimum standards" in a number of important respects. And some of the procedure not mentioned in the ABA proposals, but contained in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the American Law Institute Code, could well be adopted in Colorado.
PRACTICAL REFORM A VICTORY FOR DEMOCRACY

It should be noted once more that the American Bar Association's minimum standards are not academic or experimental but
are realistic and practical. They were recommended by practical
men, most of them practicing attorneys. Many of the recommendations are now in successful use in a few or many jurisdictions.
They are not radical or revolutionary; "on the contrary, some of
the recommendations involve a return to common law concepts
that were unwisely abandoned a century or so ago by various states;
others represent the gradual advance in simple, common-sense
methods of judicial administration." 37
By choosing the legal profession for our life's work we lawyers have dedicated ourselves to the principle of justice. We have
a duty, greater than have any other group in our society, to devote
ourselves to the pursuit of this elusive principle. It has always
been an important pursuit, but it is especially so today, when our
democratic way of life is matched, in the competition for men's
minds, with other forms of government. If our way is to win out
in the end, our administration of justice must be as nearly perfect
as we can make it. There must be a genuine respect for the law
and lawyers. We lawyers do not like to change our ways of doing
things any more than other people set in their ways. But, like
other segments of the population, we must be willing to make
some sacrifices in order to make certain the ultimate victory of
democratic institutions. The lawyers of Colorado, with their special knowledge of procedure, should take the lead in improving
the administration of justice as a part of the larger fight against
anti-democratic forces.
67 VANDERBILT, Op.

cit. note 1 8upra, at xxxi.
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SOME COMMENTS ON PRE-TRIAL
HARRY D. NIMS
of the New York Bar*

As most lawyers know, the term pre-trial is a name for a
conference held by a judge with attorneys for the parties in a
pending lawsuit to discuss matters which may aid in its disposition. Sometimes the parties themselves attend. They are always
free to do so.
Various types of this procedure have been developed since
1929 when it was first used systematically in the Circuit Court of
Michigan in Detroit. In some courts the conferences are used to
simplify the issues, obtain consents to the admissibility of evidence
and exhibits, limit the number of expert witnesses, arrange a
date for trial, and, in general, to expedite disposition of the case.
In others, it is used, not to simplify the trial and its preparation,
but to employ the good offices of a judge as a friendly, impartial
intermediary in an attempt to reach some disposition of the case
without trial, and in some instances, to transfer it by consent to
a lower court.
No legislation is required for the use of pre-trial. It is an
exercise of the courts' inherent powers to employ means adequate
to dispose of their business. Pre-trial is no longer an experiment.
Its usefulness and the practical results it can produce have been
well demonstrated. It has been found to be of very real assistance
to trial judges. Chief Justice Vanderbilt of New Jersey, in an
address to the Conference of Chief Justices in Washington, in
1950, said:'
The great gain is chiefly in the fact that the trial judge knows
what the trial will be about before he goes on the bench. No longer
does he have to spend the first hour trying to feel his way along and
the next hour trying to get out of the mistakes which have been made
in the first hour before he knew what the case was about. After a pretrial conference, the court is in command of the case from the very
moment that the trial starts. The result has been not only the shortening of cases, but the improvement of their quality and a very substantial lessening of the number of appeals.

Pre-trial can be used effectively to simplify the preparation
for trial and the trial itself. In these conferences, exhibits and
testimony are stipulated; routine facts and documents, agree* It was only through the good offices of Peter H. Holme, Jr., Judiciary Committee
chairman, that Mr. Nims was importuned to write this commentary on pre-trial. A
nationally-known authority on the law of unfair competition and trade marks, and
senior partner of the New York firm of Nims, Verdi, and Martin, Mr. Nims recently
authored a book entitled "Pre-Trial" under the joint sponsorship of the Committee on
Pre-Trial Procedure of the U. S. Judicial Conference and the Council of the ABA section of Judicial Administration.
9 F.R.D. 640.
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ments and inspections are agreed to, thus making the attendance
of many witnesses at the trial unnecessary; issues are restated
and simplified and the trial confined to the real controversy.
It can be used to simplify pleadings. Any lawyer who has
had trial experience knows how seldom on the trial are the pleadings of any real value, yet not infrequently their preparation and
amendment and the motions which are made regarding them involve substantial expense to the parties. Indeed, at times judges
complain that the pleadings frequently fail to give to the court a
definite picture of the real issues which are to be tried and not
infrequently it has been found that pleadings prevent the court
from trying the real controversies involved. In a pre-trial conference many of these difficulties can be adjusted, motions regarding them can be avoided and, in general, much saving in time and
expense can be accomplished.
Pre-trial can be used to assist in the settlement of cases without trial. "Since every lawsuit ultimately comes to an end, why
not help the parties to reach the end by amicable business-like
arrangement? Settled the case will be, if not by argument, then
by imposition through judicial pronunciamento, leaving one and
not infrequently both of the parties dissatisfied, disgruntled and
with respect for judicial process considerably shaken." 2
It is the unquestioned right of every litigant to have his cases
tried with all the formality which the rules provide if he desires,
and pre-trial must not be used to interfere with that right. But
it is also a litigant's right to have a chance to dispose of his case
just as quickly and as expeditiously as possible and by use of the
simplest possible methods, a right which we seem to have neglected
in the past.
SETTLEMENT THE GOAL IN MANY CASES ANYWAY

Before pre-trial was used, ordinarily cases were not settled
until trial was imminent, for to talk settlement before that stage
was reached, was to suggest lack of confidence in one's case. The
result has been that thousands of cases have slept on the calendars
of our courts for months, and sometimes for years, before any
attempt was made to dispose of them, although if they had been
given the opportunity, the parties and counsel in a large proportion
of them would gladly have adjusted them in a discussion attended
by a judge.
Such statistics as we have seem to indicate that in a very
large percentage of the cases begun in our courts, and which make
up our calendars, the parties do not use or intend to use the courts
for purposes of trial. They expect to dispose of their cases in
some other way than by formal trial, but the courts have made
2 Letter of Judge Harry M. Fisher of Chicago to writer, March, 1947.
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very little attempt to facilitate the disposition of cases except
through trial. We have very little information as to the proportion of such cases which are settled. We do not know whether or
not the number of such settlements is increased by the use of
pre-trial, but we do know that where pre-trial is used, particularly
where there is a backlog of pending cases, settlements often occur
much sooner than they would otherwise.
In the average court, then, the situation is that while cases
are pending they are given little if any attention by counsel or by
the court except for the taking of depositions and for procedural
motions. In almost no jurisdiction does the court employ any
fixed procedure to locate those which, if they were discussed by
court and counsel, could be settled in the conference or shortly
thereafter. Consequently, the litigants are forced to wait until the
imminence of the trial compels the counsel to face realities and
consider settlement.
SIGNIFICANT EXPERIMENTS IN NEW YORK

In the last few months, however, several of the courts of general jurisdiction in New York, the Supreme Courts of New York
(Manhattan), Kings (Brooklyn) and the Bronx counties, have
made significant and suggestive uses of pre-trial for the purpose
of disposing of pending cases which can be settled. In New York
county pre-trial conferences are used for the single purpose of
settlement of pending jury negligence cases. More than a year
ago this court, which then had and still has a very large backlog
of pending cases, began to call these cases in pre-trial conferences,
beginning with those at the head of the calendar. Cases are now
being pre-tried that will not be reached for trial for about two
years. The result has been the settlement of about 40% of the
cases pre-tried. These conferences have demonstrated that, with
the aid of the court, counsel for both plaintiff and defendant are
only too willing to dispose of many cases of this sort without trial
at almost any time after they are at issue.
About a year ago, the Justices of the Supreme Court of Kings
County installed what they term a Calendar Classification and
Control System, which also has had significant results. In May,
1949, the court began calling pending negligence jury cases to
determine whether or not they involved issues sufficiently serious
to warrant retaining them in the Supreme Court, or whether they
might be transferred by consent to lower courts. A collateral result of this procedure has been many settlements. In the court
year 1949-1950, 9,032 cases were called on this calendar. Of these
31% were settled, 18% were transferred to lower courts and 47%
were retained in the Supreme Court. The remaining 4% were deferred. The parties in the cases that were settled obtained a dis-
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position of them many months sooner than they otherwise would
have.
From the fact that settlements occur in pre-trial conferences,
it has been inferred that in the conferences judges use undue pressure on counsel to settle. Some judges have done this, but there
is a widespread feeling that this is unwise and not in the spirit
that should pervade these conferences. Such use of pre-trial is
believed to be rare today. A judge who uses pressure to get settlements discredits the procedure, defeats his own ends, and deprives
himself and his court of the very great benefits that pre-trial
properly used can confer. Indeed, many judges in these conferences do not even mention the possibility of settlement, but wait
for the suggestion to come from counsel. And it is a common occurrence that when a case is discussed in the calm, friendly, informal atmosphere of one of these conferences, somehow a case
is apt to look differently to both counsel from what it does in their
own offices.
Judge Harry M. Fisher, of the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Chicago, Illinois, described pre-trial in his court thus:The conferences are informal. The parties sit around the judge's
desk in chambers; they may even smoke, if they desire. The plaintiff's
counsel makes a brief statement of the nature of his case and the
theory or theories upon which he predicates his claim. The defendant's counsel then states the nature of his defence. A discussion
follows in which the judge participates quite freely. He often requires the production of exhibits, including photographs, X-rays, and,
where those are available, doctors' and hospital records and bills.
Police reports of accidents, writings, deeds, discovery depositions,
and witnesses' statements are examined by the judge without regard
to the competency or incompentency as evidence. Often, upon request
of a party, the judge indicates his views upon the admissibility in
evidence of a particular exhibit. If no final disposition of the case
is made, the court certifies all matters agreed upon in order to obviate
as much as possible the necessity of making preliminary or merely
formal proof. But such certifications are exceedingly rare. The great
majority of lawyers are cooperative and rely upon the promises of
their adversaries with reference to the elimination of proof. But by
far the most gratifying and valuable gains from these conferences are
derived from amazing volume of final dispositions brought about by
amicable settlements.
SHOULD PRE-TRIAL BE COMPULSORY OR ONLY ON REQUEST?

There is considerable difference of opinion as to whether pretrial should be compulsory, or should be used only on request of
counsel, or on order of the court. In New Jersey its use is compulsory in all civil cases. In the United States District Courts, and
in the courts of general jurisdiction of Boston, Chicazo and Detroit,
among others, it is used in most or all civil cases. All the methods
of using pre-trial are being experimented with, and we shortly
'Fisher,

Judicial Mediation: How It Works Through Pre-Trial Conference. 10 U.

OF CHI. L. REV. 453.
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shall have ample data as to the results. One thing seems certainit is most unlikely that anything but benefit can come from a discussion of a pending lawsuit by counsel and court.
Pre-trial is not an arbitration, either voluntary or compulsory,
nor is it a new theory of reformers-it is a natural development
in American courts. For years, judges in different states have
occasionally called in conference the attorneys in pending cases
to discuss the coming trial. This has been done, for example, in
North Dakota, Tennessee, and Kansas. Even a cursory study of
the results of the use of pre-trial in recent years can hardly fail
to raise the question as to whether or not we have not reached a
time when if we are to arrest the increasing lack of confidence
in the courts we should not consider very seriously whether it is
not possible to devise some procedure in the courts which will
involve the discussion and disposition of all cases before a formal
adversary trial is had, with its delay and expense.
THE GAME IS OFTEN NOT WORTH THE CANDLE
Thousands of cases, particularly routine negligence cases, are
finally ended by trial or otherwise for comparatively small amounts.
Two tests made recently show that in one jurisdiction 40% of a
mass of such cases were ultimately disposed of for less than $700,
while in another test, covering from January 1, 1944, to January
30, 1947, 46% of a large group of such cases were settled for less
than $1000. When we realize that jury trials, on the average,
take from two to two and one-half days and when one considers
the expense to the state of maintaining a jury court, as well as the
expense to the litigant of preparation for trial and of the trial
itself, the use of jury courts for these cases becomes decidedly
unfortunate from a practical, common sense point of view. No
attempt is made here to argue or even suggest any relaxation or
abandonment of the right to a trial by jury, but surely there is
something to be said for urging the courts to find a simpler, less
expensive method than a jury trial to decide whether a defendant
shall pay a nominal sum, $500 or $750, for a minor injury to
person or property.
In many of these cases, of course, the question of liability is
involved, but in hundreds of others that liability is obvious or
conceded. Where this is so, there is very little if any difference
between the adjustment of one of these claims and claims on insurance policies, thousands of which are disposed of satisfactorily
every month by friendly adjustment. If the courts fail to provide common sense methods for handling these routine cases satisfactorily to the public, undoubtedly a way will be found to accomplish this outside the courts.
Pre-trial seems to meet general approval of laymen. Explaining pre-trial to a layman is very easy to do, for anyone can under-
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stand at least some of the potentialities of an informal conference in which a judge and the lawyers in a case sit down together
and discuss possible ways of disposing of it. The layman's reaction to such an explanation will give the lawyer an insight into
the public's impression of present day court methods.
By simplifying trials pre-trial can make a definite contribution toward increasing public confidence in and respect for law.
Talk to persons who have served as jurymen, witnesses or litigants
in civil trials, and listen to their accounts of dreary hours of waiting in court for cases to be reached. After the trial begins, they
listen to objections to testimony, to motions to strike and to arguments of what to them seem useless technical points. They watch
highly respected and honest people prevented from telling their
story in a natural, sincere way, or from telling it at all, by what
seems to them captious and technical objections. They see obviously honest witnesses prevented from expressing their opinions
as to every day experiences of life. Ask these laymen their opinion
of the law!
PRE-TRIAL AIDS BAR'S RELATIONS WITH PUBLIC

Many of these conditions in our courts which irritate the
public and impair respect for law can be eliminated if before the
trial occurs there is a frank, friendly discussion of the case by
counsel for both parties before a judge of the court. This can
occur at any time issue is joined. One of the most important functions of a successful business today is the cultivation of friendly
relations with its customers and with the public. Our public relations-the opinion of the courts held by the average citizen-is a
subject which has been seriously ignored by the organized bar
and by lawyers individually. To this extent, our attitude seems
to be that a dissatisfied public is more advantageous to us than
the satisfied one, that it is better for us to have the public dread
the courts and avoid them than for them and for us to enjoy its
confidence and respect.
This attitude of ours is the natural outcome of the experience of lawyers over the years. For generations, unlike our professional friends, the physicians, we have followed the same steps,
used the same verbiage and formulas and followed the same procedures. We have not controlled the rules under which we work.
The legislatures have done that for us. Uniformity in ideas and
ideals have been our lot, our practice and our great misfortune.
To us a defective system is not considered a handicap for it operates on us all alike. Change, therefore, seems not to interest us.
The London Times once said that "There seems to be something
in the profession of the law which binds its votaries to the defects
of the system."
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In one of Dr. Weir Mitchell's interesting, but almost forgotten novels, "Hugh Wynne," he dealt with conditions in Philadelphia in Revolutionary times and referred to James Wilson, then
a leading lawyer of the city and later member of the Supreme
Court of the United States, and to its foremost physician, Dr.
Benjamin Rush. If Lawyer Wilson were to return to practice
today, he would find many procedures and methods in use with
which he was reasonably familiar and which he could use without
too much difficulty. But if Dr. Rush were to return to the practice of medicine, the vocabulary of his associates would be unfamiliar and the procedures and remedies which he had known
would have been largely forgotten; and if he were to attempt to
use a modern operating room, he would not even know how to
"scrub up."
PRE-TRIAL IS IN STEP WITH THE TIMES

Some of the unfortunate results of this inertia-this clinging
to old paths-this opposition to better ways-are now visible.
Recent studies show that for some time there has been a drastic
falling off in the number of civil cases tried in our courts, and
that in some categories such falling off is 50% or more. This can
mean but one thing: the public is fed up with the methods used
by the courts in handling routine civil cases and is disposing of
many of them outside the courts. This is indicated only too clearly
by the practice of including in practically all contracts arbitration
clauses which rule out resort to the courts if the contracts are
breached. It is evidenced also by the use of arbitration by trade
associations, the by-laws of some of which provide that no lawyers
shall be employed in arbitrations.
In the address above referred to,4 Chief Justice Vanderbilt

said in this connection:
The disappearance of the vast amount of litigation now carried on
through workmen's compensation bureaus, the vanishing of entire
industries from the courts through arbitration agreements, are but
shadows portending far more drastic changes in the court room if we
do not awaken to a sense of our responsibility for the efficient administration of justice.

Pre-trial is not a complete answer to these problems by any
means. But it does seem to offer a practical method of meeting
some of them which it seems unwise for us to ignore. It has been
proven beyond question that pre-trial can be used to give the litigant far better service than he is getting today in most of our
courts. Also, it offers us an opportunity to improve the practical
working of democracy in America, which at this juncture is a
matter of some importance, not only to ourselves, but to many
others outside of our borders.
'Note

1, supra.
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LAWYERS AND MARRIAGE COUNSELING-THE
THERAPEUTIC APPROACH TO DIVORCE
STEVENS PARK KINNEY
Chairman of the Domestic Relations Committee of the Colo. Bar Assn.

While many attorneys do not handle domestic relations cases,
and many attorneys practice this branch of law in a rather desultory fashion, there are a large number who can be rated as
expert consultants in this field. Lawyers have seldom, if ever, convinced the public that their function is to offer advice on domestic
issues as well as to legally sever marital ties. Social workers, physicians, judges, ministers, and priests, and even friends and relatives,
apparently rate higher than attorneys in the general lay mind in
their ability to advise the lovelorn and loveshorn.
There are many causes for this status, not the least of which
has been brought about by the lawyers themselves. The fact that
many attorneys do not handle divorce cases has given rise to the
belief that attorneys do not wish to take part in domestic difficulties,
and perhaps even in the mind of active attorneys, there is a stigma
attached to such type of practice. Secondly, many divorce cases
are handled by untrained or inexperienced attorneys whose sole
purpose is to obtain a divorce decree, and whose legal training and
background is such that they are not competent to settle the many
problems that often arise in this type of case.
Another deterrent to counseling with attorneys on the part
of parties involved in domestic problems is the fear they will be
charged high fees for such services. Moreover, they are reluctant
to discuss their personal problems with lawyers who are not personally known to them.
Lawyers receive little, if any, publicity, other than by word
of mouth, of their ability to solve and counsel with litigants in
domestic relations problems. No attorney could, even if he would,
advertise his talents in this field, whereas, the work of social consultants, doctors, writers, and other may be widely proclaimed
through the press or social agencies. Indeed, many popular writers
in widely published articles seek to blame the attorneys and the
courts for what they consider the present day evils existing in
divorce matters. These articles fail to point out the real causes
and conditions that lead to the divorce courts, but they do pin their
sensationalism and public appeal upon what the writer considers
the ease, stupidity, and the great number of divorces granted by
the courts, and on the alleged insistence and efforts of the members
of the bar in aid of such. The real truth is that attorneys have
nothing to do with the causes of divorces. The need of a separation has been established long before the usual prospective litigant
ever reaches an attorney's office.
ATTORNEYS CAN BE GOOD MARRIAGE COUNSELORS

An attorney should be the best qualified person to advise people
involved in domestic relations problems because he is well-ac-
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quainted with the laws and rulings governing the marital relationship, and has a broad and practical knowledge of the human
frailities and misunderstandings that lead to family troubles. No
conscientious practicing attorney subscribes to the theory that a
consultation on marital difficulties must in itself lead to a divorce,
annulment, or separate maintenance action. An attorney is highly
practical in his solutions of problems of this type. Any attorney
who has handled a number of divorce cases can accurately evaluate the causes that have led to the current disagreement between
spouses. Thus, he can prescribe a practical and workable solution
to the current problem, or properly conclude that there is no solution but a complete divorce.
Further, all parties concerned know that attorneys have the
knowledge and power to correct by legal means, if necessary, an
otherwise unbearable situation. They are less likely to try and
color or cloud their statements on the facts and issues involved
when discussing their problem with an attorney, or at least to do
so successfully; Attorneys are qualified by their basic general and
special training in the law and in their contacts with people to
evaluate the evidence and testimony presented to them by their
own clients, as well as the testimony of adverse parties or witnesses. Likewise, the attorney has a special confidential relationship with his clients and their statements and problems are his
exclusively, and are not to be disclosed beyond the confines of his
own office in any manner whatsoever.
Many attorneys have a sound education and knowledge of
psychological and psychiatrical problems, and they are able to understand and evaluate the motives, desires, and actions on the part
of their clients in the relationship between themselves and other
members of their families, and to discover the basic differences
presented, and in so doing to suggest a workable remedy. The attorney can maintain an unbiased attitude in his approach to these
problems, and in so doing he can sift fact from fiction, and the
important and relevant from the unimportant and irrelevant. The
attorney's knowledge is basic in that he knows that there are
always two sides to each marital problem, and in such knowledge
he can determine whether the problem is solvable or not.
How

MAY LAWYERS ATTAIN RECOGNITION IN THIS FIELD?

My conclusion is that there are today many lawyers who are
excellent domestic relations consultants. It is true that they are
generally unknown to the public, and a client must seek them out
for they neither advertise nor exploit such practical legal talents.
Further, the fees charged for such consultation by attorneys are
generally not as high, and certainly no higher, than those charged
by psychiatrists or doctors for the same service.
Lawyers themselves might evolve some plan whereby the services of such practicing attorneys might become known to those
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persons in need of their assistance, and thus enable attorneys to
take their proper place in the drive to assist married couples in
solving domestic problems without the need of legal action. Some
marriage problems can be solved by good counsel, but the lawyer
who is qualified to so act, may today be the least known and the
last consulted in this field. By the time he is, the breach is generally too wide to heal.
Thus, the gauntlet is thrown down to the bar: (1) to devise
a plan whereby the public may be made acquainted with the special qualifications of many members of the bar so that their talents
might be utilized in this ever-increasing, complex field of family
relationships, (2) to advise the general public that fees involved
in these matters are fair, and that most desirable and satisfactory
results may be obtained from consultations with competent attorneys on domestic relations problems.

WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF REQUIRING A STATEMENT OF ASSETS IN DIVORCE SUITS?
It has been suggested that the rules of the District Court of
the Second Judicial District be amended to require the filing of a
statement of assets in divorce cases. The judges have requested
that this proposed rule be given publicity in DICTA, and that members of the association express their opinion as to the advisability
therefor.
The matter has also been referred to the Domestic Relations
Committee of the Colorado Bar Association, but since the Denver
Bar Association has no committee in this field, it is suggested that
any comment on the proposal be directed in writing to the secretary, 319 Chamber of Commerce Building.
The suggested rule in substance would read as follows:
"That the plaintiff shall file with his or her complaint, and
serve on defendant with the complaint, a full detailed statement
under oath of his or her assets and liabilities, together with a
copy of the income tax return for the past two years.
"That the defendant before any hearing on alimony and in any
event in not less than twenty days, shall file and serve a similar
statement upon the plaintiff. That on motion for alimony by the
defendant the time for filing such statement shall be five days
after the service of the motion, but before the hearing of the
motion for alimony.
"That each statement filed with the Clerk be sealed by him
and not made public.
"That the Clerk of the Court prepare printed forms to be used
in filing said statements.
"That penalties be assessed against any party failing to file
complete statements or for filing false ones."
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WE FIND IT PAYS: LAW OFFICE TIME RECORDS
By JACOB V. SCHAETZEL
of the Denver Bar

We have found in our office that a large part of our practice
consists of telephone messages, both from the client and to the
client. This is caused by the fact that the client is busy and so are
we. We try to do all business that it is possible to do on the phone.
We readily recognize that there are many cases and situations
where a personal interview, either in the other lawyer's office
or in our office, is better than telephoning. Nevertheless we have
found that on many days, more than a third of our entire time
for the day has been taken up with telephone consultations of one
kind or another.
For many years we made no record of these calls. While we
tried to think of all the work done when setting the fee, we came
to realize that it would not be fair either to the client or to ourselves unless we knew fairly well the number of telephone calls
and personal interviews, together with general office work such as
typing, dictating and so forth, that we had actually done in a case.
In order to give us a better basis on which to arrive at a fair
fee, we started keeping records on plain 3x5 sheets of scratch
paper. Now as the telephone calls come in, or we are interviewing
clients or other attorneys, or talking over matters in the office,
we jot down the date, name of client, and a short record of what
took place, such as, "wrote letter concerning title." We then jot
down the number of minutes it took. In order to do this expeditiously we divide the hour into ten-minute periods and number
them from one to six. If the matter runs over an hour, we just
keep adding figures such as 15/6, i.e. two and one-half hours.
About once or twice each week we file these in alphabetical
order in a separate file, not in the clients' files. From time to time,
we ask our secretaries to go through these "time cards," as we
call them, and bunch them together so that they are more easily
handled. Once each month we go through them, and if we think
there has been sufficient time recorded, we make a charge to apply
on account only. Bills are sent each month to those clients for
all money expended and work performed. There are some exceptions, such as in estate work. In such cases, the client is billed at
the end of the period, provided it is not too far away. These time
cards are then attached to the fee slip, and filed away.
We find it pays to do this because the clients are not billed
all at once for fees which at times appear quite substantial. It also
permits us to pay our income taxes on the basis of the fees earned
during the period covered. We have tried this now for the past
seven or eight years and have found that, without exception, the
clients who are largely business people appreciate this method of
handling their business. In arriving at the fee we further take
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into consideration the work performed, the ability of the client
to pay, and whether or not we were able to either save the client
money or make some for him.

DENVER BAR ACTS TO INCREASE SALARIES
AND NUMBER OF 2D DISTRICT JUDGES
As a result of the presentation and discussion of a report of
its Judiciary Committee, under the chairmanship of George T.
Evans, the following actions were taken by the Denver Bar Association at its regular monthly meeting on December 4, 1950:
I.

RESOLUTION ON ADDITIONAL JUDGES FOR
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

WHEREAS, the volume of business of the District Court of
the Second Judicial District has greatly increased since 1923 when
the present number of judges of said court was fixed, from a total
of 3835 cases filed in 1923 to 6817 filed in 1949, and therefore the
present and anticipated load on said court far exceeds the reasonable limits of its capacity, with consequent congestion Of dockets
and delay in litigation;
It is hereby resolved:
That the Denver Bar Association urge the General Assembly
of 1951 to increase the number of district judges for the Second
Judicial District forthwith from seven to eleven.

II.

RESOLUTION ON SALARY INCREASES FOR DISTRICT, COUNTY
AND JUVENILE JUDGES OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

WHEREAS, it is evident that the present salaries of the
judges in the Second Judicial District are grossly inadequate in
the light of present economic conditions and are entirely inappropriate for the high importance and standing of the office:
It is hereby resolved:
1. That the Denver Bar Association urge the General Assembly of 1951 to increase the salaries of the judges of district courts
for the Second Judicial District, the judge of the county court of
the City and County of Denver, and the judge of the juvenile
court of the City and County of Denver to $12,000.00 per year.
2. That the Denver Bar Association urge the General Assembly of 1951 to submit an amendment to the constitution removing
the present prohibition in Article V, Sec. 30, against increasing
or decreasing the salaries of judges during their terms of office.
3. That the appropriate committees of the Denver Bar Association are hereby directed to draft whatever bills may be thought
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proper to make salary increases for district, county and juvenile
judges effective immediately, including payment of part of the
salaries by counties of the respective judicial districts.
4. That the Denver Bar Association immediately take such
steps as may appear necessary and expedient to educate the public as to the necessity of increasing the salaries of district, county
and juvenile judges as herein proposed.
III.

RESOLUTION ON COOPERATION WITH COLORADO
BAR ASSOCIATION JUDICIARY PROGRAM

It is hereby resolved:
That the Denver Bar Association pledges support to the Colorado Bar Association program for increase in the salaries of
Supreme Court, district court and county court judges throughout
the state.

OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES OF THE COLORADO
BAR ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1950-51

P resident ----------------------------------------------------------------------------E dw ard G . K now les, D enver
President-elect ..........................................................................
Hatfield Chilson, Loveland
Treasurer ....... t .........................................................................
Vernon V. Ketring, Denver
Secretary ....................................................................................
W illiam B. Miller, Denver
Senior Vice-President ......................................................
William J. Meehan, Eagle
1 Simon Quiat, Denver
Vice-Presidents ....................................................................
Jacob S. Schey, Longmont
J Warren W. Lattimer, Pueblo
BOARD OF GOVERNORS
Jacob S. Schey, Boulder Co.
A. J. Laing, Continental Divide
Winston S. Howard, Denver
Jacob L. Sherman, Denver
Myles P. Tallmadge, Denver
Floyd F. Walpole, Denver
Charles J. Beise, Denver
Sydney H. Grossman, Denver
John L. J. Hart, Denver
Fritz A. Nagel, Denver
E. H. Stinemeyer, 11th Jud. Dist.
Thomas M. Burgess, El Paso Co.
Carl Cline, First Jud. Dist.

Hatfield Chilson, Larimer Co.
George S. Graham, Mesa Co.
Charles A. Petrie, Midwestern
Allyn Cole, Ninth Jud. Dist.
Marion F. Miller, Otero-Crowley Cos.
Warren W. Lattimer, Pueblo
Raphael J. Moses, San Luis Valley
Ernest U. Sandoval, Southern
Viggo H. Johnson, Southeastern
Katherine H. Johnson, Southwestern
Frank D. Allen, 13th Jud. Dist.
M. E. H. Smith, Weld Co.

Ex-oFFicIo

James K. Groves, Grand Junction, Immediate Past President
William K. Ris, Denver, Chairman, Junior Bar Section
The President, President-Elect, Secretary and Treasurer
STATE DELEGATE TO ABA
Thomas M. Burgess, Colorado Springs
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STANDING COMMITTEES
EXECUTIVE
Edward G. Knowles, Denver, Chairman, ex-offcio
Charles J. Beise, Denver
James K. Groves, Grand Junction
Thomas M. Burgess, Colorado Springs
William K. Ris, Denver
Hatfield Chilson, Loveland, ex-officio
Jacob S. Schey, Longmont
GRIEVANCES AND ETHICS
George Epperson, Fort Morgan, Chairman
Joseph A. Craven, Denver
Raymond A. Danks, Denver
C. H. Darrow, Glenwood Springs
Chester B. Horn, Colorado Springs
Winston S. Howard, Denver

L. M. Perkins, Durango
Ernest U. Sandoval, Walsenburg
Robert G. Smith, Greeley
George L. Strain, La Junta
Thomas K. Younge, Grand Junction

LEGISLATIVE
Charles J. Kelly, Denver, Chairman
Robert G. Bosworth, Denver
Hatfield Chilson, Loveland
Leo J. Crowley, Denver
Harold H. Davies, Littleton
E. L. Dutcher, Gunnison
George T. Evans, Denver
Robert S. Gast, Jr., Pueblo

Stephen H. Hart, Denver
H. Lawrence Hinkley, Denver
William L. Lloyd, Pueblo
Ira L. Quiat, Denver
Leon H. Snyder, Colorado Springs
Robert R. Tarbell, Saguache
R. Hickman Walker, Denver

LOCAL BAR ASSOCIATIONS AND LAW INSTITUTES
Charles H. Haines, Jr., Denver, Chairman
Leo S. Altman, Pueblo
Bruce Cole, Glenwood Springs
Nicholas C. Dazzo, Trinidad
Berton T. Gobble, Brush
St. George Gordon, Lamar
James K. Groves, Grand Junction
Alfred Heinicke, Colorado Springs
Dudley I. Hutchinson, Jr., Boulder

A. J. Laing, Leadville
Harrison Loesch, Montrose
Robert M. McCreery, Loveland
R. Franklin McKelvey, Durango
Raphael J. Moses, Alamosa
Worth F. Shrimpton, Craig
William H. Southard, Greeley
George L. Strain, La Junta

SPECIAL COMMITTEES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Jean S. Breitenstein, Denver, Chairman
Guy K. Brewster, Denver
Truman A. Stockton, Denver
Charles A. Graham, Denver
Theodore A. White, Denver
Albert E. Zarlengo, Denver
CONVENTION
Thomas M. Burgess, Chairman, Colorado Springs
Hatfield Chilson, Loveland
James K. Groves, Grand Junction
Alfred Heinicke, Colorado Springs

Edward G. Knowles, Denver
William B. Miller, Denver
William K. Ris, Denver
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CRIMINAL LAW REVISION
William L. Rice, Denver, Chairman

Robert Delaney, Glenwood Springs
Irl Foard, Colorado Springs
Charles E. Grover, Denver
James S. Henderson, Denver

Bert M. Keating, Denver
Vasco G. Seavy, Pueblo
Francis L. Shallenberger, Sterling
Sherman E. Walrod, Holyoke

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Stevens Park Kinney, Denver, Chairman
Ralph H. Coyte, Fort Collins
Edward C. Day, Denver
Robert M. Gilbert, Greeley

Philip B. Gilliam, Denver
Warren W. Lattimer, Pueblo
Neil S. Mincer, Glenwood Springs

ECONOMIC SURVEY
Donald S. Stubbs, Denver, Chairman
Ralph W. Ball, Denver
Lawrence W. DeMuth, Boulder
J. Harrison Hawthorne, Canon City

Edward A. Jersin, Denver
Clifford W. Mills, Denver
Charles E. Works, Denver

FORMS STANDARDIZATION
Royal C. Rubright, Denver, General Chairman
John L. Griffith, Denver ............... Chairman, County Court Forms
Donald M. Lesher, Denver............ Chairman, District Court Forms
Saul Pinchick, Denver ------------------Chairman, Real Eestate Forms
Lyman P. Weld, Longmont ............ Chairman, Justice Court Forms
Kenneth L Wormwood, Denver ...... Chairman, Civil Instructions
William E. Doyle, Denver ............-Chairman, Criminal Instructions

Sub-Committee
Sub-Committee
Sub-Committee
Sub-Committee
Sub-Committee
Sub-Committee

INTERPROFESSIONAL COMMITTEE
T. Raber Taylor, Denver, Chairman
William L. Branch, Denver
Byron Neid, Denver
Robert Delaney, Glenwood Springs
David W. Preston, Pueblo
Frederick T. Henry, Colorado Springs
Waldo Riffenburg, Fort Collins
Lawrence A. Long, Denver
Ira L. Quiat, Denver
J. Corder Smith, Fort Morgan
JUDICIARY
Peter H. Holme, Jr., Denver, Chairman
Worth Allen, Denver
Winston S. Howard, Denver
Elmer L. Brock, Jr., Denver
Stanley H. Johnson, Denver
Thomas M. Burgess, Colorado Springs William R. Kelly, Greeley
Richard Downing, Denver
Warren W. Lattimer, Pueblo
A. M. Emigh, Durango
Raphael J. Moses, Alamosa
George S. Graham, Grand Junction
William B. Paynter, Brush
Joseph G. Hodges, Denver
Philip S. Van Cise, Denver
Carle Whitehead, Denver
LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS
William H. Robinson, Jr., Denver, Chairman
Fred Farrar, Denver
Gordon Johnston, Denver

Edward C. King, Boulder
Clifford W. Mills, Denver
Walter A. Steele, Denver
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LEGAL SERVICE
Milton J. Blake, Denver, Chairman
Katherine H. Johnson, Durango
Robert E. Anderson, Colorado Springs
Harold Taft King, Denver
Norma L. Comstock, Denver
Paul C. Lennartz, Sterling
Joseph Frascona, Boulder
Dean C. Mabry, Trinidad
Robert S. Gast, Jr., Pueblo
John W. O'Hagan, Greeley
William L. Gobin, Rocky Ford
Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr., Denver
John I. Green, Antonito
Paul Irey, Denver Legal Aid Society,
James K. Groves, Grand Junction
ex-officio
Harold E. Hafer, Fort Collins
William B. Miller, Denver Lawyers
Donald T. Horn, Lamar
Referral Service, ex-officio
Philip F. Icke, Ouray
(All association members are considered supporting members of this committee for the purpose of rendering legal services to persons in the armed forces
with due consideration given to the serviceman's ability to pay therefor,)
MINIMUM FEE
Jacob H. Chisen, Denver, Chairman
Willis E. Parkison, Glenwood Springs
Donald G. Brotzman, Boulder
Sam Parlapiano, Pueblo
Richard P. Brown, Denver
Raymond M. Sandhouse, Sterling
George M. Cherrie, Canon City
Harry S. Silverstein, Jr., Denver
Clyde T. Davis, La Junta
Robert G. Smith, Greeley
Alden T. Hill, Fort Collins
Theodore D. Schey, Longmont
Harrison Loesch, Montrose
Fred A. Videon, Craig
OIL AND GAS
John H. Tippit, Denver, Chairman
Frederic L. Kirgis, Denver
Milton J. Keegan, Denver
Daniel Milenski, Cortez
George V. Kempf, Montrose
Richard P. Ryan, Denver
PUBLIC RELATIONS
Sydney H. Grossman, Denver, Chairman
Louis G. Isaacson, Denver
David Brofman, Denver
John F. Kelly, Denver
Edward C. Day, Denver
Donald M. Lesher, Denver
William E. Doyle, Denver
Kelly O'Neall, Jr., Denver
Philip B. Gilliam, Denver
David Rosner, Denver
George S. Graham, Grand Junction
M. E. H. Smith, Greeley
Victoria F. Gross, Englewood
Leonard v. B. Sutton, Colorado Springs
Paul M. Hupp, Denver
L. B. Ullstrom, Denver
REAL ESTATE STANDARDS
Edwin J. Wittelshofer, Denver, Chairman
Clay R. Apple, Greeley
George M. Gibson, Colorado Springs
William H. Hyde, Grand Junction

Benjamin F. Koperlik, Pueblo
Royal C. Rubright, Denver
Jacob S. Schey, Longmont

STATUTES PUBLICATION
Allyn Cole, Glenwood Springs, Chairman
Harry A. King, Denver
Thomas M. Burgess, Colorado Springs
Clyde 0. Martz, Boulder
Dayton Denious, Denver
Floyd F. Miles, Denver
James K. Groves, Grand Junction
Allen P. Mitchem, Denver
Hubert D. Henry, Denver
William B. Paynter, Brush
Stanley H. Johnson, Denver
H. B. Van Valkenburgh, Denver
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SUSTAINING MEMBERSHIPS
William E. Hutton, Denver, Chairman
E. Ray Campbell, Denver
Dudley I. Hutchinson, Boulder
John T. Haney, Colorado Springs
James W. Preston, Pueblo
TAXATION
John L. J. Hart, Denver, Chairman
E. B. Adams, Grand Junction
Robert C. Nihan, Denver
W. Clayton Carpenter, Denver
Harry S. Peterson, Pueblo
Phillip G. Cole, Colorado Springs
Merrill E. Shoup, Colorado Springs
Floyd K. Haskell, Denver
Thornton H. Thomas, Jr. Burlington
TRAFFIC COURTS
Richard H. Shaw, Denver, Chairman
Robert E. Anderson, Colorado Springs
David Brofman, Denver

Hubert D. Henry, Denver
John R. Hickish, Denver

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
Lawrence A. Long, Denver, Chairman
Earle Bryant, Montrose
William A. Mason, Rifle
Charles T. Byrne, Brighton
Percy S. Morris, Denver
John J. Dooley, Greeley
William R. Newcomb, Denver
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
H. Harold Calkins, Denver, Chairman
Herbert A. Alpert, Fort Collins
Leo S. Altman, Pueblo

L. James Arthur, Denver
Richard M. Davis, Denver

JUNIOR BAR SECTION
William K. Ris, Denver, Chairman
PATENT SECTION
H. B. Van Valkenburgh, Denver, Chairman
PROBATE AND TRUST SECTION
Simon Quiat, Denver, Chairman
WATER LAW SECTION
Glenn G. Saunders, Denver, Chairman
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